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Abstract 
A multivariate approach to optimal bidding strategy is presented.  An 
optimal formulation is derived and a method of parameter estimation 
proposed. 
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1Introduction 
 
Friedman's (1966) first formulation for optimal bidding has been 
criticised as demanding unrealistic amounts of data to estimate the 
model parameters.  Hanssmann and Rivett (1959) partially solve this by 
reducing the number of parameters in the model and thus the data 
demands, but with loss of predictive power.  Multivariate methods offer 
a means of better utilisation of all available data, depending on the 
adequacy of certain assumptions concerning the statistical properties 
of bids.  Recent empirical studies (Skitmore, 1991) indicate that, with 
suitably transformed data, these assumptions may not be unduly violated 
in construction contract auctions.  This paper considers the use of one 
such multivariate approach for deriving optimal mark up values against 
both single and multiple competitors. 
 
 
2A multivariate approach 
 
Profit depends on the mark up value, v.  A low mark up increases the 
chance of acquiring a contract, but with little profit, while 
conversely a high mark up gives a larger profit, but with little chance 
of acquiring the contract.  We propose a model for the probability of 
obtaining a contract as a function of bid, x, or equivalently, v.  
Since v=x/c where c is the cost estimate, we can choose an additive 
formulation if we work on a log scale. 
 If for a particular contract, xi, i=1,2 ... ,n are the (log 
transformed) bids, treated as continuous random variables with joint 
probability density function f(x1, ... ,xn) then 
 
 
 
 P(x1 <xi, i≠1) = 
 
 (1) 
 
where f(...) is the joint probability density function of the n bids (n 
is assumed to be known). 
 
Now assuming the variables are independent, it follows from (1) that 
Pr(y1 <yi for all i, i≠1) = 
 
 (2) 
 
In the case of the Normal distribution, Pr(y1 <yi for all i, i≠1) = 
 
 (3) 
 
For the special case where f1(y1)=f2(y2)= ... fn(yn) 
 
 Pr(y1 <yi for all i, i≠1) = 1/n (4) 
 
 
3Optimal bidding 
 
Empirical analysis (Skitmore, 1991) suggests that bids may be 
adequately modelled by 
 
 yij ~ N(αi+βj,σi
2) (5) 
 
 
where yij = ln(xij-mx(1)j) and 0.5<m<0.9 (x(1)j being the value of the 
lowest bid entered for the contract).  The simplifying assumption of 
independence is still maintained and so all we need do is replace μi in 
(3) by αi+βj.  The probability of bidder 1 entering the lowest bid now 
becomes 
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 (6) 
as the βj values cancel. 
 
A further assumption is that applying a mark up multiplier of v to x1 
affects the mean in (5) by an amount of v'.  Then the probability of 
entering the lowest bid becomes 
 
 (7) 
 
where 
 
 (8) 
 
which can be estimated by 
 
 
where c= total number of contracts 
dij= 1 if bidder i bids for contract j 
  0 otherwise 
  c 
ni= Σ dij = number of contracts in which bidder i bids 
 j=1 
 
Since we have assumed log-normality, v' is also given by 
 
 
which can be estimated by 
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if it were true that 
 
 
then the relationship (still under log-normality) simplifies to 
 
 
Our objective is to find the mark up v* to maximise expected profit.  
Since profit can be taken as zero for those contracts which we do not 
win, we need to compute 
 
 (a) 
 
where A is the (unknown, but assumed fixed, actual cost).  From Bayes 
formula, we have the conditional distribution of 
 
 
(a standardised, transformed bid), given that the contract is won, 
given by 
 
 
 (b) 
 
and P(win) is simply the normalisation constant given by (7).  Thus we 
can interpret the integrand in (7) as 
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  (c) 
 
the density of z1, and 
 
 (d) 
 
Hence 
 
 
can be computed by writing x in terms of z1 and averaging over the 
distribution of (b).  Specifically 
 
 
The point of writing the expression in this form is that α1, βj and mx(1) 
are constants which do not affect the optimisation wrt v.  Hence to 
maximise (a) wrt v, we need only maximise 
 
The eα1y1 can be absorbed into 
 
 
resulting in a shift of the lower limits of integration for the Yj's so 
that we maximise 
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4Parameter estimation 
 
For the purposes of parameter estimation, we use the model 
 
 (9) 
 
where αi is a bidder location parameter, βj is a contract datum 
parameter, and  αi + βj = μij.  This requires the solution of 
 
 (10) 
 
where εij if N(0,σi
2) 
 
The log-likelihood is 
 
 (11) 
Where δij =1 if bidder i bids for contract j 
          =0 if bidder i does not bid for contract j 
The MLL over α's, β's and σ2 is 
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The procedure involves initialising all αi = 0 and iterating (12) and 
(13) to convergence.  The estimates of σi
2
 provided by (14) are adjusted 
for bias by the approximation 
 
 (15) 
 
where 
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For computational purposes it is unnecessary to introduce once only 
bidders, ni = 1, until after convergence of the iteration procedure.  
Convergence is taken to have occurred when the largest change in 
estimated value of any αi in consecutive iterations is less than εα 
where εα is small (a value of 10-7 is appropriate for most cases). 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
A new method has been described for the extraction of optimal mark up 
values in contract bidding by means of a multivariate model.  Parameter 
estimates are obtained by method of maximum log likelihood.  The method 
can easily be extended to situations where the contract size, identity 
or number of bidders are uncertain 
 
The work described is part of research programme, currently funded by 
the UK Science and Engineering Research Council, to extend the mark up 
based system described in this paper into a full bidding decision 
support system tailored to the specific needs of construction 
companies. 
 
The authors are indebted to Mike Patefield and Ernest Wilde of the 
University of Salford, Department of Mathematics, and Roy Thomas of the 
University of Salford, Department of Civil Engineering for their kind 
help and major contribution to the early theoretical development of the 
research. 
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